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This Policy Update’s Special Focus considers the 
situation in Greece, where asylum seekers face rapidly 
deteriorating reception conditions while being 
targeted by toughened asylum laws and plans to 
reintroduce systematic detention. Whereas Greece and 
the European Commission have urged for greater 
returns from Greece to Turkey, other actors are calling 
the future of the EU-Turkey Statement into question.
Other sections cover the Essex tragedy in which 39 
people lost their lives in a refrigerated lorry container 
in the UK, and the calls for legal pathways and greater 
protections for migrants that followed in the 
aftermath. This update also considers the European 
Commission’s green light to Croatia’s accession to the 
Schengen Area, pending approval by Schengen 
member states. This prompted a renewed focus on 
violent pushbacks at Croatia’s borders.
Furthermore, the EU’s continued cooperation with the 
Libyan Coast Guard is facing increasing criticism. 
MEPs and NGOs alike accused the EU, and Italy in 
particular, of complicity and a lack of control over 
Libya’s abuse of migrants. This update also discusses 
the mounting calls on EU states to meet – and increase 
– their resettlement commitments.
Further sections look at the European Parliament’s 
failed resolution on search and rescue and the formal 
approval of the Regulation of the European Border and 
Coast Guard (Frontex). The case law section considers 
the CJEU’s November judgments in Haqbin and X, 
which concern the withdrawal of material reception 
conditions and family reunification respectively. In 
the Closer Look section, the European Network on 
Statelessness highlights the lessons from their 
one-year pilot project on the inclusion of stateless 
people, titled #HearItFromUs.
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 SPECIAL FOCUS 
  Rising pressure on asylum seekers in Greece ​.  
 ​  Asylum ​.​ ​ ​  Immigration Detention  ​  ​  Children and Youth ​.​ ​ ​  Inclusion ​. 
This Special Focus discusses recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Conditions                     
faced by refugees and other migrants on the Greek islands reached breaking point, with                           
renewed protests, a new restrictive asylum law and plans to reintroduce systematic                       
detention all further contributing to a climate of hostility. Meanwhile, a series of Turkish                           
actions placed a strain on EU-Turkey relations and prompted renewed questions about the                         
legitimacy and future of the​ ​EU-Turkey Statement​. 
As noted in the previous ​EPIM Update​, over the past months, Greece has witnessed the                             
largest increase in arrivals since 2015, a significant worsening of conditions on their                         
islands and the beginning of a new crackdown on migrants, including plans to return                           
10,000 people to Turkey. ​Arrivals to Greece have continued to rise and reached over ​69,000                             
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in 2019 so far, which is more than Spain, Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Bulgaria – other states at                                   
the external EU border – combined. This was felt the strongest on the Greek islands, where,                               
as of ​December​, around 40,000 people were living in spaces designed for merely 8,000. Most                             
newly arrived asylum seekers are Afghans, Syrians and Iraqis who are escaping the                         
escalating conflict in Afghanistan or the increasingly hostile environment for ​refugees in                       
neighbouring countries, particularly Iran and​ ​Turkey​. 
As a result, conditions in the camps deteriorated further. ​Michael O’Flaherty​, Director of                         
the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), declared the plight of migrants on the Greek                           
islands as “the single most worrying fundamental rights issue” in the EU. The Council of                             
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ​Dunja Mijatović​, described the situation as a                       
“struggle for survival”. ​MSF stressed the lack of basic services: there was one toilet for                             
every 300 people in Samos, and one shower for every 506 in the Moria camp in Lesbos. As                                   
UNHCR warned, the 5,000 unaccompanied minors in Greece are particularly vulnerable.                     
Many children are sleeping in ​unacceptable ​conditions and are at risk of ​exploitation​. Most                           
have not been appointed a ​guardian​, and over 1,000 have ​gone missing​. NGOs also warned                             
that, for the fourth consecutive year, ​preparations had not been made in time for winter,                             
which will greatly aggravate the humanitarian crisis over the months to come. 
A November ​report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) called on parties to ​take stock                               
of the causes of the migration management crisis in Greece, as well as Italy. It highlighted                               
the substantial delays in processing asylum claims, noting that asylum seekers arriving in                         
the Greek islands in late 2018 were being given interview dates for 2023. Moreover,                           
fast-track asylum processes aimed at identifying people to return under the EU-Turkey                       
Statement, which were meant to take a few days, in reality took an average of 215 days in                                   
2018. This was partly due to a lack of doctors to assess vulnerabilities. At the same time, the                                   
ECA warned that EU agency support had not always been effectively directed to where it                             
was most needed, and that the ​emergency relocation scheme of 2015 had not meaningfully                           
alleviated the pressure on Greece and Italy. Only 34,705 people were relocated, compared to                           
an initial target of 160,000 and actual commitments made by EU member states of 98,256.                             
ECA attributed this to the low share of migrants eligible for relocation and Italy and                             
Greece’s large delays in processing them. Meanwhile, ​ECRE stressed that the EU’s                       
containment strategy of prioritising the EU-Turkey Statement over humanitarian                 
approaches, early integration processes and responsibility-sharing was to blame. 
In this context, ​calls mounted for the ​transfer of people to the mainland, structural                           
improvements to the Greek ​asylum ​system​, and the ​relocation of ​children from the Greek                           
islands to other EU member states. The ​Greek ​government repeatedly requested EU support                         
in relocating unaccompanied minors, 70% of whom are estimated to have family elsewhere                         
in Europe. However, only the ​Netherlands was reported to have responded at first. ​France                           
subsequently committed in December to relocate 400 asylum seekers from Greece. 
Greece, in turn, announced plans to ​transfer 20,000 people to the mainland by early next                             
year. They are to be distributed equally among regions and housed either in rented-out                           
accommodation or disused industrial facilities. 9,500 people were transferred between                   
October and early ​December​, although arrivals significantly exceeded the pace of                     
relocation. However, the transfers were met with ​hostility in the ​receiving ​regions​. In some                           
towns, like ​Nea Vrasna and ​Katsikas​, protesters prevented asylum seekers from leaving                       
their buses, forcing them to be relocated elsewhere. In ​Diavata​, nationalist groups held a                           
pork and alcohol barbecue in front of a refugee camp hosting mostly Muslim migrants,                           
prompting fierce​ ​debates​ in the Greek parliament over how to respond to the protests. 
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Greece’s treatment of and policy towards migrants also came under criticism. ​Turkey                       
accused Greece of conducting illegal pushbacks of over 25,000 migrants at their ​land                         
border in the first ten months of 2019. ​Several ​NGOs corroborated these allegations.                         
Furthermore, in November, ​legal aid organisations in Lesbos alerted that 28 asylum                       
seekers’ applications were rejected without the legally required interview due to a lack of                           
interpreters. They stressed that this compromised the right to an effective remedy and                         
violated EU law. Most problematically, Greece announced a toughening of asylum laws and                         
the goal of increasing returns to Turkey. On 1 November, the ​Hellenic Parliament passed                           
the controversial ​International Protection Bill to that end. It was rushed through                       
Parliament in a matter of days, in an apparent effort to reduce​ ​scrutiny​. 
Its ​contents were met with great concern. First and foremost, the law undermines                         
important ​safeguards in the asylum procedure. It allows the police and armed forces to                           
conduct asylum interviews, makes it harder for appeals to be considered admissible,                       
removes independent experts from appeals committees and restricts the suspensive effect                     
of appeals. In addition, if asylum seekers do not fulfil complex residence requirements –                           
which ​NGOs described as “continuous traps” – their asylum application will be withdrawn.                         
UNHCR and multiple ​NGOs warned that these unduly coercive measures would endanger                       
access to international protection. ​Commentators also stressed that they are                   
counterproductive. People who struggle to access asylum procedures could find themselves                     
undocumented, excluded and destitute, often without the possibility of being returned. This                       
will place further​ ​pressure​ on the system and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Greece. 
Second, the Bill targets vulnerable applicants. Post-traumatic stress disorder will no longer                       
explicitly qualify as a vulnerability. Victims of torture, rape or other significant acts of                           
violence will now require certification from the Greek public health system, which asylum                         
seekers can no longer ​access​. Unaccompanied minors over the age of 15 will cease to be                               
treated as vulnerable. The law also narrows the definition of ‘family members’ to exclude                           
families established after leaving their country of origin, including children. ​UNHCR noted                       
that this ignores the often protracted nature of forced displacement and will harm family                           
unity. Other measures cut support for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection                       
and restrict the NGOs that can continue to​ ​assist migrants​ in Greece. 
A third concerning development is the ​systematic detention of asylum seekers. The ​Bill                         
broadens the grounds for detention and extends the maximum detention period from 3 to                           
18 months, plus an additional 18 months of pre-removal detention. It also foresees the                           
creation of ‘Closed Temporary Reception Facilities’. Following the Bill’s passing, the                     
government announced that it would build detention centres with a capacity of up to 5,000                             
people each in the most crowded islands, to exist ​alongside the camps. The new ​facilities are                               
expected to be ready by July 2020 and will host both newly arrived asylum seekers and                               
those facing return to Turkey. ​NGOs expressed ​outrage at the resort to detention as the                             
default, especially for vulnerable people, and warned that it could make it harder to                           
provide ​legal support​. De facto detention was previously implemented in the Greek islands                         
following the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016, but soon ​abandoned due to international                       
condemnation​ and the limited capacity to run closed facilities. 
Against the background of worsening conditions in Greece and the stated objective of                         
increasing returns to Turkey, questions were also raised about the future of EU cooperation                           
with Turkey. Concerns surrounding the EU-Turkey Statement are ​not new​, yet the                       
agreement has continued to hold. The ​Commission has ​repeatedly defended the Statement,                       
calling for cooperation to be strengthened and ​returns to be accelerated. It also increased                           
its financial support to Turkey: an additional ​€50 million will be directed to boosting                           
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Turkey’s coast guard alongside further ​humanitarian assistance through the EU Facility                     
for Refugees in Turkey. The Facility’s total budget of €6 billion will continue to be disbursed                               
until 2025 at the latest.​ ​Greece​ called on the EU to consider increasing these funds further. 
Meanwhile, several incidents in the autumn subjected EU-Turkey cooperation to further                     
pressure. On 9 October, ​Turkey launched a military intervention in north-eastern Syria                       
that led to the ​displacement of at least 180,000 people. The incursion was in line with its                                 
plan to establish a ‘​safe zone​’ in which 1 to 3 million Syrian refugees could be resettled from                                   
Turkey. Human Rights Watch (​HRW​) warned against the notion of a safe zone, noting that                             
protection could not be guaranteed and they often become death traps. The ​EU continued to                             
oppose the intervention and rejected Turkey’s calls for diplomatic and financial support,                       
stressing that no ​funds under the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey could be used to                               
resettle Syrians outside of Turkey. Other sources of tension included Turkey’s ​repatriation                       
of detainees thought to be Islamic State fighters back to Europe, which ​European ​countries                           
have long resisted, and Europe’s move to ​sanction Turkey for its illegal ​drilling off the coast                               
of Cyprus. This escalated in December, as Turkey reached an ​agreement on maritime                         
boundaries with Libya that challenged Greece and Cyprus’ territorial​ ​sovereignty​. 
In this tense context, Turkey’s President Erdoğan issued repeated ​threats to the EU in                           
October and ​November that he would “open the gates” and allow Syrian refugees to enter                             
Europe unless the EU supported Turkey’s operation in Syria or granted it more funds to                             
assist refugees. These threats to end cooperation on border management are not new, and                           
the Turkish Coast Guard Command has ​continued ​intercepting thousands of people                     
attempting to enter Europe regardless. However, the threats have become more frequent as                         
of late, prompting concern from​ ​Greek​ and​ ​EU​ officials about future rises in arrivals. 
During a debate in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee, ​MEPs                           
from multiple parties argued that the EU was being held hostage by President Erdoğan’s                           
blackmailing. They noted that Turkey’s forced returns of Syrians and its military                       
intervention showed that the country could not be considered safe for returns.                       
Representatives from ​civil society called for an end to cooperation and returns, reiterating                         
that “in humanitarian terms, the EU-Turkey Statement is a​ ​tragedy​”. 
 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
  The Essex tragedy: a reckoning for Europe​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​ ​ ​  Immigration Detention  ​ ​ ​  .     
On 23 October 2019, Essex ​Police discovered the bodies of 39 ​Vietnamese nationals in a                             
refrigerated lorry container on the outskirts of London. It is unknown whether the victims                           
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were seeking asylum in Europe, except for one, a ​teenager who had absconded from a                             
reception centre in the Netherlands. The death toll makes this the worst tragedy in the UK                               
since the ​Dover incident in 2000 when 58 Chinese nationals died in similar circumstances.                           
So far, police investigations have led to several ​arrests on smuggling charges in the UK and                               
Vietnam. The recent incident takes place in the context of an ​upsurge in ​attempts by                             
migrants to cross the English Channel. As outlined in the previous ​EPIM Policy Update​,                           
large-scale ​evictions of temporary refugee camps in the Calais area coupled with a new ​ban                             
on food distribution have pushed migrants to take alternative routes and greater risks to                           
cross the Channel. As a result, more migrants are crossing through ​Belgium​. The victims of                             
the Essex lorry tragedy were smuggled into the UK via the Belgian cargo port of ​Zeebrugge​,                               
confirming this trend. 
In the aftermath of the Essex tragedy, UK Home Secretary ​Priti Patel announced the                           
deployment of additional immigration officers at both Belgian and British ports, in                       
agreement with the Belgian authorities. She also urged the government to be “​ruthless​” in                           
its actions to dismantle smuggling networks. However, ​commentators were critical about                     
the government’s ​politicisation of the tragedy in a bid to strengthen migration controls.                         
Moreover, the Essex tragedy sparked an intense debate around the current efforts to tackle                           
irregular migration at the UK and EU level. 
First, ​commentators warned that UK migration policy was compromising the safety of                       
migrants. They voiced concerns about the increased ​use of technology and patrolling                       
equipment and enhanced ​cooperation with other state authorities to detect stowaways.                     
Rather than deter migrants from travelling, ​additional controls and restrictions push them                       
to resort to smugglers and take greater risks in order to avoid detection. Likewise, the UK’s                               
Foreign Affairs Committee​, taking stock of the UK migration policy in a recent report, urged                             
the government to move away from a policy focusing on closing borders exclusively. On a                             
wider scale, ​commentators also stressed that the Essex events are a tragic reminder of the                             
perilous journeys that migrants take to reach Europe. Similarly to the UK, the EU fight                             
against irregular migration has so far reflected a security-oriented approach. As observed                       
by ​ECRE​, the current EU ​strategy does not address the demands and intentions to migrate.                             
It focuses only on tackling the supply aspect of smuggling through law enforcement,                         
enhanced information exchange and cooperation at the EU level and with third countries. 
Second, in the aftermath of the Essex tragedy, ​several ​NGOs renewed their calls for more                             
legal pathways to avoid future tragedies. The ​FRA stated that by doing so, the EU and its                                 
member states will “save lives and reduce the suffering that people trying to come to the EU                                 
endure”. Currently, ​opportunities to enter the EU legally are thin and remain limited to                           
highly-qualified or ​seasonal third-country workers, or voluntary ​resettlement schemes. In                   
the weeks that followed the Essex tragedy, several additional incidents highlighted the                       
urgency of significant reforms in this context. Groups of nationals from Syria, Sudan and                           
Afghanistan were found in three UK-bound trucks in northern ​Belgium​, ​France and the                         
Netherlands​, in two cases at serious risk of hypothermia. Similar cases followed in                         
southern France​ and at the border between​ ​Greece​ and Turkey. 
Third, the Essex tragedy highlighted the ​lack of protection available to migrants at risk of                             
trafficking. ​Vietnam​, the country of nationality of the Essex victims, has one of the highest                             
rates of victims of trafficking. Despite being two separate issues in principle, migrant                         
smuggling and human trafficking often ​overlap in reality. Migrants who pay to move                         
clandestinely across countries can be forced into sexual or labour exploitation by the same                           
smugglers once they arrive in the destination country. ​Commentators voiced concerns                     
about the ​failure of existing ​anti-trafficking policies​, which predominantly focus on                     
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prosecuting traffickers rather than protecting victims. In addition, given their status as                       
undocumented migrants, victims of trafficking often risk being ​detained during the                     
assessment of their case. As a result, more than ​500 possible victims of trafficking were                             
reported to have been held in UK detention centres in 2018 due to the enforcement of                               
immigration rules.​ ​NGOs​ warned that this practice is in breach of​ ​international​ and​ ​EU law​. 
 
  Continued criticism of EU cooperation with Libya​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​ ​ ​  Immigration Detention  ​ ​ ​  .     
The EU, and in particular Italy, have long faced criticism for their border management                           
cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), which includes training, information                     
sharing and financial ​support​. Concerns have recently mounted as the humanitarian                     
situation in ​Libya deteriorated further. Much remains ​unknown about the extent of the                         
suffering of the over 650,000 migrants estimated to be in Libya. UNHCR began conducting                           
evacuations from Libya to ​Rwanda in September, in addition to the evacuations to ​Niger                           
that have been ongoing since 2017. Nevertheless, it was forced to ​reject a large number of                               
resettlement requests, leaving ​hundreds of migrants to sleep outside its Gathering and                       
Departure Facility (GDF) in Tripoli. Meanwhile, those hosted within the centre were                       
reportedly no longer being fed. ​UNHCR stated that their infrastructure and resources were                         
stretched thin and that it had to ​reduce the ​support offered by the GDF in favour of “urban                                   
assistance packages”. It ​continued to plead to states to increase their resettlement                       
commitments​: although Libya hosts over 45,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers, as                       
of mid-November, only​ ​6,169​ resettlement places had been offered. 
Despite the ongoing civil conflict, the LCG has continued to intercept and return migrants                           
departing from the country. An ​estimated 58% of migrants attempting to cross the                         
Mediterranean were pulled back to Libya. Two incidents in particular raised alarm. First,                         
on ​18 October​, the LCG reportedly intercepted a migrant boat within the Maltese search and                             
rescue (SAR) area with Malta’s coordination. ​UNHCR warned that this would amount to a                           
violation of international law. Shortly afterwards, an ​agreement between Malta and Libya                       
reportedly surfaced, revealing that they have been cooperating to intercept and return                       
migrants before they enter Malta. As a result, almost no migrants have reached Malta                           
autonomously. However, the ​Maltese and ​Libyan governments denied the existence of this                       
deal. A second incident took place on 26 October, when the NGO ​Sea Eye reported that the                                 
LCG fired shots at its rescue vessel, the Alan Kurdi, and the 90 people it was rescuing. 
The EU and Italy have, however, stood by their cooperation with Libya. The EU’s naval                             
mission, Operation Sophia, has been ​criticised for ​alerting the LCG when it spots a ship in                               
distress, but not NGOs conducting SAR missions in the area, thereby facilitating an                         
interception and pull-back to Libya. The ​mission's mandate was renewed at the end of                           
September, including its support for the LCG. In turn, the ​Italian government announced in                           
November that its 2017 Memorandum of Understanding with Libya would be renewed for                         
another three years, committing further training of and significant resources for the LCG.                         
Italian Foreign Minister ​Luigi Di Maio stated that its impact in stemming arrivals and                           
deaths at sea is “undeniable”. Some ​amendments reportedly being ​proposed for the                       
renewed agreement, which will require Libyan approval, include better detention                   
conditions and greater access for humanitarian organisations to detention centres. 
In this context, ​MEPs made renewed calls to halt cooperation with Libya or make it                             
conditional on migrants’ safety and human rights being protected. ​NGOs and ​other                       
commentators echoed these demands. While ​praising a decision by ​France to halt a                         
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transfer of boats to Libya, they accused the EU of complicity in the LCG’s human rights                               
violations. They insisted that, contrary to statements by the Italian government, Libya                       
cannot be considered ​safe for returns, regardless of the presence of international                       
organisations. They also noted that the Central Mediterranean route has, in fact, become                         
more dangerous as a result, not least due to the LCG’s attempts to obstruct rescue                             
operations. A leaked ​EU report added to mounting concerns by showing the total absence of                             
EU leverage over or ​monitoring of conditions in Libya. EU calls on Libya to address human                               
rights violations, coercion and disappearances within detention centres have been ignored,                     
and EU officials have not been allowed to monitor LCG operations. There is also ​little clarity                               
as to how the ​€475 million given to Libya has been used. Recent ​investigations also                             
highlighted that known human traffickers have benefited from the cooperation. 
  Commission endorses Croatia’s Schengen accession​. 
 ​  Mobile EU citizens​ .​ ​ ​  Asylum ​. 
Following evaluations taking place between 2016 and May 2019, the European Commission                       
gave its ​green light to Croatia’s accession to the Schengen Area on 22 October. Before this                               
can become a reality, the ​EU Council will first have to discuss the Commission’s assessment.                             
Current Schengen states must unanimously approve the entry of a new member to the                           
Schengen Area. As the bid is opposed by ​Slovenia and several ​other states​, ​observers argue                             
that Croatia will not be part of the borderless area in the immediate future. Notably,                             
Bulgaria and Romania met the technical requirements for accession as early as 2011.                         
However, due to ​opposition from current members, neither of the two states have joined the                             
Schengen Area yet. 
The endorsement also sparked ​criticism and raised ​questions about the willingness of the                         
Commission to put an end to the ​violence against migrants in Croatian border areas. As                             
covered in the previous ​EPIM update​, since 2016, NGOs have widely documented collective                         
and summary expulsions and the use of force by Croatian border officials. ​Experts argue                           
that these practices are in breach of non-refoulement and that they violate EU asylum                           
procedures. As such, they would amount to infringements of the ​Schengen Borders Code​. In                           
its ​communication on Croatia’s application of the Schengen acquis, the Commission                     
admitted that the protection of the right to asylum and the alleged use of force by border                                 
guards “remain a challenge”, while nevertheless concluding that Croatia meets the                     
requirements for joining Schengen. The Commission’s ​support to Croatia’s accession                   
elicited widespread ​criticism​. ​HRW accused the Commission of sending the message that                       
serious human rights abuses are not an obstacle to Schengen accession. A ​group of local                             
NGOs called for Croatia’s Schengen membership to be made conditional on the immediate                         
halt of pushbacks and systematic attacks against migrants and asylum seekers. 
Questions about the EU’s financial support to Croatia’s border police have also been raised.                           
Prior to the Schengen accession approval, ​Amnesty International accused the Commission                     
of complicity in human rights violations, as the latter made substantial financial                       
contributions to border surveillance instead of humanitarian aid. Since 2015, EU ​financial                       
support for the training, assistance and technical equipment of the Croatian border police                         
has grown, with the ​aim to “better protect and manage the EU’s external borders.” Evidence                             
of violence collected by ​NGOs suggests that this funding may be used to support police                             
officers who push migrants to neighbouring countries without giving them access to the                         
international protection procedure. Instead of reconsidering its financial commitments                 
after the Commission’s decision was made public, former Commissioner for Migration and                       
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Home Affairs ​Dimitris Avramopoulos promised ​extra funding​. This will be used to assist                         
Croatia’s border police, particularly on the borders with​ ​Bosnia and Herzegovina​. 
In this context, ​experts have urged the EU to rethink its policy of ​migration containment                             
before it gives way to a ​humanitarian emergency in the whole region. More specifically, the                             
actions taken by the Croatian border police mean that a significant number of migrants                           
are stuck in neighbouring countries in ​appalling conditions​. This situation is illustrated by                         
the Vučjak makeshift ​camp in ​Bosnia and Herzegovina​. The ​camp drew ​international                       
condemnation due to the severe health and safety ​risks its residents faced. Following                         
protests by the UN ​Special Rapporteur for Human Rights of Migrants and ​repeated calls by                             
the Human Rights ​Commissioner of the Council of Europe, ​Bosnian authorities closed the                         
camp in early December. As ​centres in the country are full, residents were transferred to                             
temporary reception facilities​. However, with growing ​ethnic tensions and Bosnia’s                   
administrative structure complicating the establishment of new ​facilities​, it remains                   
unclear where and when the ​former occupants will be offered appropriate reception and                         
accommodation conditions. 
  EU resettlement: Failing to meet refugee needs​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.  
E​U ​member states have failed to meet their commitment to resettle 50,000 people in need of                               
international protection by 31 October, as originally planned under the ongoing 2017 ​EU                         
resettlement scheme​. ​The European Commission launched the initiative as a follow-up to                       
the ​first-ever EU-wide resettlement scheme, which resulted in almost ​20,000 people being                       
resettled to Europe between July 2015 and September 2017. According to data provided by                           
the ​Commission​, only 39,000 people had been admitted to EU countries by mid-October                         
under the ongoing programme. In response to this, the ​Commission postponed the deadline                         
to the end of the year. It also announced a new resettlement scheme to be launched in 2020,                                   
with 30,000 resettlement places already made available by 15 member states. 
Increased resettlement commitments have generally been welcomed by ​civil society and                     
international organisations​. However, in a joint statement ahead of the first ​Global Refugee                         
Forum​, several ​NGOs highlighted that EU resettlement efforts – which account for only                         
1.6% of global resettlement needs – remain insufficient. These considerations are made                       
against the backdrop of a growing number of people in need of resettlement. According to                             
the latest ​UNHCR estimates, global resettlement needs will reach over 1.44 million refugees                         
in 2020. On several occasions, ​UNHCR has urged EU states to ​expand their resettlement                           
strategy, including increasing their commitments for the ​evacuation of refugees from                     
Libyan​ detention centres, as discussed above. 
A factor limiting the effectiveness of ongoing EU resettlement schemes is their voluntary                         
nature and reliance on ad hoc commitments. This will remain the case if the pending                             
proposal for an ​EU Resettlement Framework is adopted. Made in 2016, this proposal seeks                           
to create a structured and permanent framework which organises resettlement efforts                     
across the Union. However, ​experts highlighted that it lacks ambition since commitments                       
would remain non-binding. In addition, the Framework proposal has been ​criticised for its                         
approach to resettlement. In particular, ​several ​NGOs noted that the proposal frames                       
resettlement as a migration management tool instead of a global responsibility-sharing                     
mechanism, by making resettlement commitments conditional on third countries’                 
cooperation in migration control policies. 
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 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
  European Parliament votes down resolution on 
search and rescue​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.  
On 24 October, the ​European Parliament rejected a ​resolution proposed by the LIBE                         
Committee on SAR in the Mediterranean Sea by a narrow margin of only two votes. Ahead                               
of the vote, the chair of the LIBE Committee and Rapporteur of the motion, ​Juan Fernández                               
López Aguilar​, declared that “[o]ur [SAR system] urgently needs to be reformed”. ​Although                        
not binding, the resolution sought to clarify the Parliament's position on the issue and                           
could have pressured the Commission to take action in several areas.  
In a context where humanitarian activists face risks of ​systematic criminalisation​, the                       
resolution asked the Commission to adopt guidelines that clarify which forms of assistance                         
should not be criminalised by member states. The resolution stressed the importance of                         
making use of all vessels, including those operated by NGOs, to save ​more lives​, and urged                               
member states to keep their ports open to NGO ships. At the same time, the motion                               
highlighted that private vessels are no substitute for ​state-led responses to emergencies. In                         
the absence of an effective and comprehensive ​SAR strategy​, the resolution called on                         
member states to fulfil their obligations under international law by setting up a long-term,                           
structural and coordinated approach in the Mediterranean. Welcoming the ministerial                   
meeting on SAR and disembarkation in Malta in ​September while recognising the ​failure to                           
secure a consensus on the ​agreement​, the motion called on the Council to put forward a                               
position on a fair and sustainable distribution mechanism for rescued migrants. Finally,                       
noting that Libya is not a safe port, the motion also called on the Commission, member                               
states and Frontex to ensure that disembarkation only takes place in areas of safety. 
Reacting to the proposals, ​NGOs stressed that “Europe must do everything in its power to                             
prevent further tragedies” and expressed their support for the motion. Both Renew Europe                         
and the Socialists & Democrats backed the resolution. However, far-right parliamentarians                     
joined forces with the centre-right ​European People’s Party to the surprise of some                         
commentators to sabotage the ​politically-charged initiative. ​EU centrists were ​blamed for                     
having allied with the far right. Yet, the failure to pass the resolution was ultimately due to                                 
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a handful of votes from ​non-aligned MEPs​. The vote shows that the fragmented European                           
Parliament that resulted from the ​May 2019 elections faces difficulty in pushing for                         
progressive initiatives. 
  European Border and Coast Guard Regulation is 
formally approved​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.  
The revised European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) ​Regulation was formally adopted                       
by the ​Council in November and entered into ​force in December. It provides ​Frontex with a                               
standing corps of 10,000 staff by 2027 and an expanded ​mandate on returns, border                           
management operations and cooperation with third countries beyond the immediate                   
neighbourhood. Frontex’s role in the EU’s neighbourhood has already been increasing. In                       
2019, the EU signed agreements on Frontex cooperation with ​Montenegro and ​Serbia and                         
launched the first joint operation with ​Albania following an ​agreement reached in 2018.                         
Further agreements with Northern Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will follow. 
The Regulation and civil society’s reactions were discussed in our April 2019 ​EPIM Policy                           
Update​, when a political agreement was reached between the European Parliament and the                         
Council. Commentators have repeatedly expressed concerns around Frontex’s ​rights                 
compliance and claimed that the new Regulation does not ​sufficiently strengthen its                       
accountability mechanisms. The Agency has also been ​criticised for its lack of                       
transparency​. In November, the ​CJEU ruled that Frontex does not need to disclose basic                           
information regarding their border operations, such as the name, type, and origin of their                           
vessels. ​Experts have further warned against inflated expectations, noting that the Frontex                       
reform will not be a catch-all solution to reduce migratory pressures. Rather, it must be                             
coupled with greater responsibility-sharing both within and beyond the EU.  
  
 SELECTED ECJ CASE LAW & LEGAL ACTIONS 
  
   Immigration Detention ​  ​  Children and Youth ​.​ ​ ​ Asylum ​.   
Case ​C-233/18 Haqbin v Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers, 12 November                         
2019 
On 12 November, the Court of Justice issued a judgment clarifying the circumstances in                           
which member states can impose sanctions and withdraw reception conditions for asylum                       
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seekers who breach rules of reception facilities or are guilty of particularly violent                         
behaviour. The proceedings involved an Afghan national who arrived in Belgium as an                         
unaccompanied minor. After getting involved in an altercation with other residents of the                         
reception facility in which he was located, he was expelled and forced to sleep rough in a                                 
park in Brussels for 15 days. In its ruling, the Court held that sanctions might, in principle,                                 
involve the deprivation of material provisions. However, the sanctioning power of                     
authorities is qualified by both procedural and substantial safeguards provided by the                       
Reception Conditions Directive​. Accordingly, the Court ruled that penalties must be                     
objective, impartial and proportionate, and must follow an individual assessment of the                       
circumstances of the case. For the Court, it is possible to withdraw the material reception                             
conditions in exceptional and duly justified cases. For instance, states may transfer                       
applicants to a separate reception centre or even hold them in detention. However, dignified                           
living standards must be ensured in all circumstances. Member states cannot withdraw,                       
even temporarily, material reception conditions to the effect of placing the applicant in a                           
situation of extreme material poverty. The withdrawal of housing, food or clothing support,                         
the Court clarified, does not comply with EU law as it necessarily violates the applicant’s                             
dignity. The Court also affirmed that when the penalties concern minors, their vulnerability                         
and best interests are to be considered as the primary consideration. In a context where the                               
withdrawal of reception conditions is increasingly used as a ​punitive measure​,                     
commentators​ welcomed the decision, particularly the strengthened protections for minors. 
Case​ ​C​‑​706/18​, X v Belgian State, 20 November 2019 
This case concerned an application for family reunification by an Afghan national who                         
sought to join her spouse in Belgium. The initial decision to reject the application was                             
confirmed on appeal by the ‘Council for asylum and immigration proceedings’. After a                         
further challenge by the applicant, the Belgian Council of State remitted the decision to the                             
‘Council for asylum and immigration proceedings’ because the application had been rejected                       
almost eight months after being submitted. Under Belgian law, state officials only have six                           
months to establish if an application for family reunification meets the requirements. After                         
this period, Belgian law provides that applicants must automatically be granted a residence                         
permit. This clause applies without exception, even if there are doubts about the genuine                           
existence of a family link. In the present case, the Belgian ‘Council for asylum and                             
immigration proceedings’ asked the CJEU to clarify whether the Belgian legislation complies                       
with the ​Family Reunification Directive​. In its ruling, the CJEU highlighted that the Directive                           
establishes substantive conditions for exercising the right to family reunification.                   
Accordingly, an application must be accompanied by documentary evidence. Where                   
appropriate, national authorities may also conduct interviews and collect further evidence.                     
For the Court, what follows from this is that national authorities are required to establish                             
the existence of family links before issuing a residence permit. Vice versa, national                         
authorities are not allowed to issue a permit without establishing whether the requirements                         
have actually been met. The Court therefore concluded that Belgian legislation undermined                       
the effectiveness of the Directive and was not in compliance with EU law. 
Other relevant case law 
Joined Cases ​C-540/17 and C-541/17​, Federal Republic of Germany v Hamed and Omar, 13                           
November 2019 
Case ​T‑31/18​, Izuzquiza and Semsrott v European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 27                         
November 2019 
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 A CLOSER LOOK FROM... 
  ​European Network on Statelessness ​. 
   Inclusion  ​  ​  Asylum ​.  
By Khadija Badri, Advocacy and Engagement Officer,​ ​European Network on Statelessness 
According to official statistics, nearly 100,000 asylum seekers who arrived in the EU                         
between 2015 and 2018 were recorded as ‘stateless’ or of ‘unknown nationality’. However,                         
the issue of statelessness has been missing from European debates and policy responses on                           
asylum and migration, and the voices of stateless people are mostly absent. Being stateless                           
is often critical when navigating European asylum procedures and can affect many aspects                         
of a refugee’s experience, from increased ​time spent in reception centres to delayed                         
decision-making​ and additional barriers to​ ​integration​.  
In 2018, the ​European Network on Statelessness launched a one-year pilot called                       
#HearItFromUs, which sought to promote the voices and views of stateless refugees and                         
migrants in the migration debate. ​We worked closely with our members ​Consonant​,                       
Fundación Cepaim and ​New Women Connectors ​to bring together representatives of                     
communities affected by statelessness in the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. This work                         
culminated in three community workshops in May and June 2019, where we discussed the                           
key issues affecting stateless people and co-developed ideas to strengthen our collaboration. 
The workshops made clear that, while all countries have unique approaches to statelessness                         
(see our ​Statelessness INDEX​), members of stateless communities face similar problems in                       
the three countries, including barriers to accessing basic rights such as work and                         
healthcare and the negative impact of statelessness on mental health. Participants also                       
noted barriers to accessing legal procedures and obtaining citizenship, and discussed                     
authorities’ perceived lack of understanding and awareness about statelessness.  
The pilot project provided ​central lessons for collaborating with stateless people. The                       
workshop participants’ enthusiasm to work together on statelessness was clear and build                       
relationships with communities is crucial, but may first require overcoming various                     
obstacles. Members of these communities can be reluctant to work with unfamiliar NGOs or                           
to identify as ‘stateless’. The lack of dedicated support for community-led organisations –                         
many of whom rely on volunteers – also presents a barrier to ensuring that stateless people                               
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can engage on statelessness and in wider debates. For collaboration with stateless people to                           
be sustainable and effective, dedicated time, skills and resources are necessary, as well as a                             
commitment to ensuring that the views of women, LGBTQI+, youth and others are heard to                             
represent the diversity of people affected by statelessness. 
The first twelve months of the pilot have laid the groundwork to continue improving the                             
representation of stateless refugees and migrants. Last October, we were joined at the                         
UNHCR​’s High-Level Segment on Statelessness ​in Geneva by Nijam Uddin Mohammed,                     
General Secretary of the British Rohingya Community and one of our newest British                         
members. His intervention at our ​civil society side event, and the ​awareness-raising work of                           
stateless activists like ​Lynn Khatib proves that the experiences and voices of stateless                         
people can no longer be ignored. ​We will continue to provide information about                         
statelessness to those affected, ​and at our ​Annual General Conference in May 2020, we will                             
bring together community representatives and stateless activists from across Europe. We                     
hope that this way of working with communities will bring Europe closer to our vision of a                                 
place where all stateless people can access their rights, and all states have legal frameworks                             
in place to protect stateless people and prevent new cases of statelessness from arising. 
 
 FACTS & FIGURES 
   
Venezuelans submitted 10,690 asylum applications in the second quarter of 2019, making                       
them the second-largest group of asylum seekers in the EU, with a 90% recognition rate. 
Source: ​Eurostat, September 2019. 
 UNHCR statistics on arrivals​. 
  Asylum ​. 
Recent data by the UNHCR​ ​reveal​ the following trends: 
● 95,870 sea arrivals have been recorded since the beginning of the year. 11,083 have arrived                             
in Italy, while 55,189 have arrived in Greece and 24,625 have arrived in Spain; 
● So far, an estimated 1,234 people have been reported dead or missing in 2019; 
● In Italy, the majority of refugees come from Tunisia, Pakistan and Côte d’Ivoire, while two                             
thirds all refugees arriving in Greece originate from Afghanistan and Syria. In Spain, the                           
majority of refugees come from Morocco, Algeria and Guinea. 
  Relevant reports​. 
  Asylum ​.​  ​  Inclusion ​.​ ​ ​ Children and Youth ​.  
Amnesty International: Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s Illegal Deportations of Syrian Refugees 
 
Amnesty International published a ​report documenting 20 cases of Syrian refugees in                       
Turkey being forcibly returned to Syria in 2019. The report urges Turkey to uphold its                             
international obligations towards refugees, while calling on the EU to raise resettlement                       
pledges for Syrian refugees in Turkey and to halt returns under the EU-Turkey Statement. 
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UNDP: Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe 
 
This ​report focuses on African migrants travelling to Europe irregularly for development                       
related reasons. It addresses the drivers that push this group to leave, the challenges faced                             
in building a stable life and accessing the labour market in Europe, as well as their diverging                                 
attitudes towards a possible return to Africa.  
  EU Funding opportunities​. 
  Asylum ​.​ ​ ​  Inclusion ​.​ ​ ​  Children and Youth ​.  
Calls for proposals - EU funding 
● MIGRATION-04-2020​: Inclusive and innovative practices for the integration of recently                   
arrived migrants in local communities. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 05.11.2019 – Deadline: 12.03.2020 
● MIGRATION-05-2018-2020​: Overcoming integration challenges for migrant children. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 05.11.2019 – Deadline: 12.03.2020 
● MIGRATION-09-2020​: Narratives on migration and its impact: past and present. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 05.11.2019 – Deadline: 12.03.2020 
● MIGRATION-10-2020​: Sustainable practices for the integration of newly arrived migrants. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 05.11.2019 – Deadline: 12.03.2020 
● TRANSFORMATIONS-22-2020​: Enhancing access to education to reverse inequalities. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 05.11.2019 – Deadline: 12.03.2020 
 EU CALENDAR: UPCOMING EVENTS 
 
European Parliament 
 
13-16 January 
10-13 February  EP Plenary 
 
9, 20-21 & 27-28 January 
6 & 19-20 February  LIBE Committee Meetings 
Other events 
  16 January 
Building a Whole-of-Society Approach to Emerging Migration and               
Integration Challenges​, OECD 
  25 February 
Solutions and the Global Compact on Refugees - A Long Road                     
‘Home’​, Refugee Law Initiative 
 
This document provides a focused analysis of recent EU level policy-making, legislation and jurisprudence                           
relevant to EPIM’s sub-funds on (1) Immigration detention; (2) Reforming the European Asylum System;                           
(3) Children and Youth on the Move; (4) Mobile EU citizens and (5) Building Inclusive European Societies and                                 
covers the period from 15 October to 16 December 2019. We kindly ask the readers to keep in mind that the                                         
present Policy Update is composed of a selection of documents and does not claim to be exhaustive. 
 
Should you, as representatives from EPIM’s Partner Foundations or EPIM-supported organisations, have                       
questions related to the analysis provided in this document or on EU developments in the field of migration                                   
and integration in general, you are invited to contact the authors ( ​o.sundberg@epc.eu ​, ​ah.neidhardt@epc.eu ​,                         
n.maganza@epc.eu ​, ​m.desomer@epc.eu ​). The sole responsibility for the content lies with the author(s) and the                           
content may not necessarily reflect the positions of EPIM, NEF or EPIM’s Partner Foundations. 
 
For more information on EPIM, please visit ​www.epim.info ​.
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